Convergence clubs, the euro-area rank and the relationship between banking and real convergence by Massimiliano Affinito
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)
Convergence clubs, the euro-area rank 

















1   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
Convergence clubs, the euro-area rank 
and the relationship between banking and real convergence
by Massimiliano Affinito
Number 809 - June 2011The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial  Board:  Marcello  Pericoli,  Silvia  Magri,  Luisa  Carpinelli,  Emanuela 
Ciapanna, Daniela Marconi, Andrea Neri, Marzia Romanelli, Concetta Rondinelli, 
Tiziano Ropele, Andrea Silvestrini.
Editorial Assistants: Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.CONVERGENCE CLUBS, THE EURO-AREA RANK 






This paper analyses banking convergence, measured through the ratios of deposits and 
loans to GDP, across 65 countries, compares it with per capita income convergence, and tests its 
effect on real convergence. The focus of the paper is the group of countries that have adopted the 
euro as a single currency (euro area). It compares the degree of banking and real convergence 
among these countries with that reached by other 17 potential convergence clubs around the 
world (including the EU-27, the OECD, the G20, OPEC, and the Arab League). It employs a 
diversity of methods (β- and σ- analyses, stationarity tests, IV regressions) and finds three main 
results. First, the degree of convergence is higher within the clubs than in the entire sample, and it 
is diversified across the clubs. Second, all methodologies confirm euro-area banking 
convergence. Third, banking convergence has a positive and significant impact in fostering real 
convergence. 
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1. Introduction
1 
The analysis of economic growth long run convergence across countries is a traditional 
and central issue of economic research. After the euro was chosen as a single currency by several 
countries,  many  works  extended  the  analysis  of  convergence  to  banking  indicators.  Banking 
convergence is a relevant issue because it is strictly linked to integration (e.g. Adam et al., 2002), 
which in turn has implications for the single monetary policy, financial stability and economic 
growth (e.g. Artis et al., 2000; Danthine et al., 2001; Gaspar et al., 2003; Guiso et al., 2004; Lane, 
2006).  Moreover,  convergence  of  banking  indicators  counts  in  itself  since  it  helps  to  avoid 
asymmetric effects and to allow the single monetary policy to perform its smooth functioning 
(e.g. ECB, 2007). This paper deals with these issues and draws on three vast fields of research: 
income convergence, banking convergence, and the literature on finance and growth.  
Regarding  the  literature  on  income  convergence,  I  exploit  the  many  different 
interpretations of convergence that have been offered and methodologies used (see, for example, 
the surveys of Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Temple, 1999; Islam, 2003) to pursue an eclectic and 
pragmatic strategy that combines several empirical methods applied to both income and banking 
convergence indicators. My empirical strategy is divided into three steps. The first step relies on 
β  and σ  convergence analysis (e.g. Barro and Sala i Martin, 1991 and 1992; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Sala i Martin, 1996; Lee et al., 1997), and obtains an overview of general convergence for 
real and banking indicators. The second step is based on tests of zero mean stationarity (e.g. 
Bernard and Durlauf, 1995 and 1996; Evans and Karras, 1996; and Tsionas, 2000), and it is used 
for checking the first step results, and to detect the degree of convergence of separate clusters 
around different cross country averages. The third step combines the results of the first two steps 
to verify whether there is a link between real and banking convergence. 
Turning  to  the  literature  on  banking  convergence,  I  exploit  three  aspects  on  which 
researchers  and  policymakers  have  reached  a  substantial  consensus.  First,  I  tackle  the  issue 
empirically,  and  investigate  banking  convergence  through  the  analysis  of  two  indicators  (the 
ratios of deposits and loans respectively to GDP), since the literature shows that, compared with 
real GDP growth rate convergence, there is no clear theory on banking convergence and that the 
issue is therefore basically an empirical question. Second, I collect data from the 1960s, since the 
literature  stresses  that  convergence  is  a  long term  concept.  Finally,  I  compare  euro area 
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convergence with that reached by other groups of countries around the world, since the literature 
states that convergence is a relative concept and the only reliable method to assess the degree of 
convergence of a group of countries is to use control samples. 
I refer to these control samples as potential convergence clubs. This expression derives 
from Baumol (1986), who coined the term “convergence club” to express the idea that some sets 
of countries, characterized by economic or institutional links, might converge faster and more 
fully  than  others.  My  overall  sample  includes  65  countries,  which  I  divide  into  17  partially 
overlapping potential convergence clubs. As clarified in detail later, subsequent studies showed 
that Baumol’s analysis suffered from a selection bias, and that any identification of clubs is not 
free of problems. Accordingly, and since I am interested in the effects of international affiliation 
and not in abstract statistical clustering, I follow a simple criterion. Since my focus is the euro 
area (which can be treated as an international organization), I simply identify the control clubs on 
the  basis  of  countries’  membership  in  international  organizations  (the  EU 27,  OECD,  G20, 
OPEC,  the  Arab  League,  etc.),  and  for  further  control,  I  add  clubs  identified  by  geography 
contiguity.  
The literature on banking convergence generally concludes that in the euro area some 
segments of financial market have made greater progress in convergence than retail banking (e.g. 
Centeno and Mello, 1999; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Kleimeier and Sander, 2000; Adam et al., 
2002; Baele et. al., 2004; Dermine, 2006). It also finds that intra country convergence is higher 
than euro area convergence (e.g. Affinito and Farabullini, 2009; Gropp and Kashyap, 2009), and 
consequently analyses the factors hampering convergence (e.g. Affinito and Piazza, 2009). By 
contrast, my approach based on a comparison among several potential convergence clubs around 
the world shows that euro area banking convergence is higher than that of the other clubs. 
Finally, as for the literature on growth and finance, I exploit some of its concepts and 
methodologies (in particular from Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes, 2005; and Abiad, Leigh 
and  Mody,  2007),  and  show,  as  far  as  I  know  for  the  first  time,  that  banking  convergence 
facilitates per capita income convergence. 
My findings are statistically robust, because they are based on the concurrence of results 
and tests obtained by very different methods, and are economically and politically relevant. They 
show  that  euro area  affiliation  makes  banking  convergence  easier,  which  in  turn  seems  to 
enhance per capita income convergence, disclosing another reason why it is significant to monitor 
banking convergence. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes my methodology. 
Section 3 reviews the potential convergence clubs in my dataset, and explains how they are   7 
identified.  Section  4  describes  the  data.  Section  5  shows  my  econometric  outcomes  and 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
My empirical analysis is divided into three steps. Each step in turn relies on different 
indicators, approaches and specifications, which are summarized in Figure 1.  
2.1. First step (β and σ convergence): Do banking and real convergence exist? 
In the first step, I use two complementary measures: β and σ convergence. As far as β 
convergence  is  concerned,  the  empirical  literature  on  income  growth  regresses  the  average 
growth rate of per capita income on its initial level and interprets a negative correlation as a sign 
of convergence. In other words, there is β convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster 
than and to “catch up” with richer countries. I proceed in the same way, applying the concepts of 
β analysis  to  per  capita  income  as  well  as  to  two  banking  indicators  (Loans/GDP  and 
Deposits/GDP). 
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where  Yi,t  is  the  variable  of  interest  for  country  i  at  date t; 
T
t t it Y T 0 )] [log( 1
= D   is  the  average, 
between  the  first  period  t0  and  the  last  one  T,  of  first  differences  of  the  logarithm  of  Yi,t, 
corresponding  to  its  average  growth  rate; 
0 log it Y   is  the  logarithm  of  the  initial  level  of  the 
variable of interest; εit is an error term. 
Following  the  literature  on  economic  growth,  I  distinguish  between  absolute  and 
conditional convergence  for  all  my  indicators. Convergence  is  absolute  if  β  is  negative in a 
univariate regression, i.e. without controlling for additional variables on the right hand side of the 
equation (1.1), then Xit = 0.
2 Convergence is conditional if a negative β is obtained after allowing 
for  other  country  structural  characteristics  Xit.  Conditional  convergence  implies  that,  even  if 
countries do not reach the same level of the variable of interest, they can reach their respective 
                                                 
2 Absolute convergence can be viewed as a test for a unit root (e.g. Levin et al., 2002), which underpins my second 
approach. In fact, if |β| = 1, a unit root is present, the time series is said to have a stochastic trend and there is no 
convergence. On the contrary, if β is negative, the hypothesis of the unit root can be rejected.   8 
steady  states.  Therefore,  conditional  convergence  suggests  that  a  country  positioned  further 
below the steady state level tends to grow faster.
3  
My  second  measure  of  convergence  is  σ convergence,  which  is  obtained  from  the 
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where  t y  is the mean of the logarithm of  it Y . There is σ convergence when the dispersion of the 
variable of interest across groups of economies tends to fall over time:  t T t s s < + . 
Although related, the two measures of convergence have different informational contents. 
Moreover, β convergence does not formally imply σ convergence, since it is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for σ convergence (Quah, 1993; Barro and Sala i Martin, 1995).
4  
2.2. Second step (tests of zero mean stationarity): What is the most convergent 
club? 
My  second  step  explores  real  and  banking  convergence  through  tests  of  stationarity 
applied  to  differentials  between  two  time series  (e.g.  Hobjin  and  Franses,  2000;  Harvey  and 
Carvalho,  2002;  Harvey,  2002;  Busetti  et  al.,  2007).  My  methodology  is  based  on  three 
computations (Busetti et al., 2007; Affinito and Farabullini, 2009). 
First, I calculate the differentials Dit for each variable of interest. These differences can be 
computed  following  two  alternative  approaches  (Figure  1):  (i)  the  bilateral  differentials  Dit
j 
between each pair of countries; or (ii) the differences Dit
A between each country and the common 
average of a group of countries (e.g. Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Hobijn and Franses, 2000; 
Corrado, Martin and Weeks, 2005; Pesaran, 2007). 
In the first approach, the bilateral differentials Dit
j between each pair of countries are 
defined as:  
 
Dit
j = Yit − Yjt  (2.1) 
                                                 
3 About conditional convergence of per capita income, Islam (1995) argues that “... convergence is more commonly 
understood as different countries of the world approaching the same or similar levels of income [i.e., in the ‘absolute’ 
sense]. There is probably little solace to be derived from finding that countries in the world are converging ... when 
the points to which they are converging remain very different”.  
4 In other words, mean reversion is not an indication that cross sectional variance decreases over time. Sala i Martin 
(1996) explains the conceptual difference between the two convergence measures writing: “σ convergence studies 
how the distribution of income evolves over time and β convergence studies the mobility of income within the same 
distribution”.    9 
 
where apex j indicates that the differences Dit are between countries i and j, with i ≠ j, and Yi,t is 
defined as in equation (1.1). If these differentials Dit
j are computed for all pairs of countries, the 
total number of bilateral differentials is NT (NT – 1) / 2, where NT is the total number of countries.  
In  the  second  approach,  the  differentials  Dit
A  between  each  country  and  the  common 
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where apex A indicates that the differences Dit are obtained between each country i and the 
common average of a group of countries  ∑
- =
C N
C t N Y
1 it
1 Y , where NC is the number of countries 
in the group; and Yi,t is defined as in equation (1.1). 
Second, once the differentials Dit are computed as either in equation (2.1) or (2.2), I verify 
whether they are either nonstationary or stationary processes by utilizing the augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. In formal terms, the ADF test verifies if a unit root is present by testing the 
null hypothesis ρi
* = 0 against ρi
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r r r  The test signals convergence when ρi
*< 0, i.e. if it rejects 
the  hypothesis  that  a  unit  root  is  present;  or  equivalently  when  ρi<  1,  i.e.  if  it  rejects  the 
hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
Third, I verify the zero mean stationarity of stationary differentials Dit by utilizing the 
Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin  (KPSS)  test,  which  verifies  their  zero mean  stationarity, 
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where 
2
LR s )  is a non parametric estimator, robust to autocorrelation and to heteroscedasticity, of 
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where  ) ( ˆ t g  is the sample autocovariance of Dit at lag τ; w(τ, m) is a weight function defined as 
1 1 ) , ( + - = m m w t t , and m is such that, as T → ∞, m → ∞ and  0
2 ® T m . 
This methodology based on both ADF and KPSS tests aims at increasing the power of the 
tests, in particular at decreasing biases in favour of convergence. However, as a check of my 
results, the two kinds of test are also run separately. 
Since in equation (2.2) the differentials
A
it D are computed on an average of countries in the 
same group, the average  t Y  can be seen as a steady state where the group of countries might 
converge. In other words, if the countries of a group converge to the common mean  t Y , then a 
homogeneous model of development might emerge (convergence club), and it should be captured 
by  t Y , which represents the common, long run trend. 
In the following, I refer to equation (2.1) to indicate the approach based on equations 
(2.1),  (2.3),  (2.4)  and  (2.5);  and  I  refer  to  equation  (2.2)  to  indicate  the  approach  based  on 
equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5). 
2.3. Third step (parallel convergences): Does banking convergence favour real 
convergence? 
My third step uses the results of the previous steps in order to assess if there is a link 
between banking and real convergence. Although many studies have found a nexus between 
finance and growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993a,b; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine, 1998 and 
1999; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes, 2005; Demirgüç Kunt 
and Levine, 2008), the relationship that might emerge between their respective convergences has 
received less attention. A number of factors can contribute to their simultaneous convergence. 
Obstfeld (1994) demonstrates that financial integration allows greater saving diversification and 
hence a shift in output growth. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) note that financial integration and 
high capital mobility may accelerate the convergence toward long run levels of per capita output. 
Abiad, Leigh and Mody (2007) point out that greater financial integration differentiates current   11 
accounts and allows poorer countries to attract capital from richer countries and to accelerate 
their growth.  
In this light, some studies have tested if global financial integration benefits long run 
growth and investigated the effect on growth rates of the international reallocation of capital. This 
literature has produced no consensus because, paradoxically, capital often moves from poorer to 
richer  countries  (e.g.  Lucas,  1990;  Kose,  Prasad,  Rogoff  and  Wei,  2006;  Prasad,  Rajan  and 
Subramanian,  2006). More  recently,  Henry  (2006)  and Abiad,  Leigh  and  Mody  (2007)  have 
argued  that  the  role  of  international  capital  flows  might  be  that  of  influencing  the  income 
convergence rather than raising the steady state rate of growth. I follow their argument, testing 
the  effect  of  banking  convergence  on  per  capita  income  convergence.  To  the  best  of  my 
knowledge, such an analysis has not yet been utilized, probably because of the difficulty of 
measuring  banking  convergence  and  implementing  this  measure  in  an  estimation  of  real 
convergence. Again I use two approaches (Figure 1). 
The first approach consists simply in regressing the following equation: 
 
gi = bi + ui  (3.1) 
 
where gi and bi are dummies taking the value of one when the bilateral differentials between a 
pair of countries is zero mean stationary (results of equation 2.1), respectively, for per capita 
income and, alternatively, for one of the two banking indicators, and ui is an error term. The 
regressor bi is instrumented as explained in detail in Section 5. 
The second approach basically follows the methodology of Aghion, Howitt and Mayer 
Foulkes (2005), who examine the effect of a phenomenon on per capita income convergence 
interacting a proxy of the phenomenon with the initial level of per capita income. The likelihood 
of real convergence increases if and only if the coefficient of interaction term turns out to be 
significantly negative (in this line also Abiad, Leigh and Mody, 2007).
5 
This second approach is described by the following equation of an IV absolute β analysis:  
 
it i it BG
T
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where G is the per capita income, B is a proxy of banking convergence; βBG is the coefficient of 
the interaction term, and the other symbols are defined as in equation (1.1). My interaction term 
                                                 
5  Aghion,  Howitt  and  Mayer Foulkes  (2005)  explore  the  effect  of  financial  development  on  per  capita  income 
convergence, while I analyse the effect of banking convergence on per capita income convergence. As clarified in 
Section 5, I also fellow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes in the choice of several robustness checks.    12 
is between the initial level of per capita income and a proxy of banking convergence Bi, which is 
computed either on Loans/GDP or on Deposits/GDP. 
In turn Bi is alternatively measured in two ways. The first uses the results of equation 
(2.2). In this case, the banking convergence proxy is a dummy taking the value of one when the 
country  converges  to  the  average  of  my  entire  sample  (bilateral  differentials  between  each 
country and the whole cross country average). The second uses the results of σ convergence 
analysis of equation (1.2) to get a convergence indicator with continuous values. In order not to 
change the interpretation of the sign of the interaction term coefficient, Bi in this case is obtained 
as follows: 
 
Bi = 1 – σi / σmax   (3.3) 
 
where σi is defined as in equation (1.2), and σmax is the highest value of σi. Banking convergence 
decreases in σi and increases in Bi; this is bounded between zero and one by construction.
6 
As detailed in Section 5, the banking convergence proxy Bi, in both its definitions, and the 
regressor bi in equation (3.1), are all estimated with linear models and are instrumented to solve 
possible problems of endogeneity. This is done because most studies find that the nexus between 
finance and growth moves from the former to the latter, but there is no lack of reverse causality 
explanations (e.g. Shan et al. 2001; Allen et al., 2005), and the finance growth relationship might 
also be driven by simultaneity bias.  
3. Potential clubs 
My entire dataset includes 65 countries, divided into 17 partially overlapping potential 
convergence clubs (Table 1 and 2). As mentioned in the Introduction, my main focus is the euro 
area, the potential club composed by the countries adopting the euro. The other countries and 
potential clubs are basically used as control samples. 
I use the expression “potential convergence clubs” to mean groups of countries which 
may be supposed to converge faster and to a greater degree than the larger sample as a whole. 
This interpretation of potential convergence clubs derives form the concept of convergence club 
that can be traced back to Baumol (1986), who coined the expression to indicate that the presence 
or  absence  of  unconditional  convergence  depends  on  the  country  sample.
7  My  potential 
                                                 
6 σi  tends to zero and Bi tends to one when convergence improves in the sample. By construction, σi = σmax and Bi is 
equal to zero when convergence is minimum in the sample.  
7 Baumol (1986) obtains a significant negative coefficient on the initial income variable in a growth initial level 
regression for 16 OECD countries and for a group of formerly centrally planned countries, and takes this as evidence   13 
convergence  clubs  are  identified  on  the  basis  of  their  geographic  contiguity  or  countries’ 
membership in international organizations. This choice deserves to be clarified because it could 
appear open to the same criticism levelled at Baumol, whose club selection, according to De 
Long (1989) and Quah (1996a), suffers from a self selection bias.
8 
In the literature that addresses the problem of the choice of criteria to be used in order to 
group the countries before testing for club convergence so as to prevent self selection biases, two 
main approaches can be found. The first holds that a group of countries can reach a particular 
equilibrium,  and  thus  can  be  empirically  identified  as  a  club,  on  the  basis  of  conditioning 
variables,  namely  if  each  of  countries  shares  the  initial  position  or  they  all  present  strong 
similarities in structural, institutional and technological conditions (e.g. Durlauf and Johnson, 
1995; Desdoigts, 1999; Canova, 2004). The second approach identifies the clubs endogenously 
with  no  conditioning  variables,  but  using  statistical  tools  (e.g.  Hobijn  and  Franses,  2000; 
Corrado, Martin, and Weeks, 2005). However, there are drawbacks to both of these procedures. 
For  the  first  approach:  (i)  it  entails  the  difficulty  of  detecting  and  choosing  the  relevant 
conditioning variables; (ii) if the initial income cut off is used, the choice of the cut off date 
remains arbitrary; (iii) allowing for any attribute makes it hard to distinguish club convergence 
from conditional convergence.
9 By contrast, the second approach omits factors which determine 
the clustering, and so it is liable not to yield any policy guidance (for a broad discussion, see 
Islam, 2003).  
On the other hand, Corrado, Martin and Weeks (2005) suggest that “hypothetical clubs” 
of intra country regions may be easily identified on the basis of simple common characteristics 
such as spatial proximity, political factors and country membership. Accordingly, a reasonable 
method  of  classifying  groups  of  countries  is  to  use  their  geographic  contiguity  or  their 
membership in international organizations. As neighbouring regions, and regions within a given 
nation, share institutional frameworks, regulatory systems, consumer tastes, and technologies, it 
stands  to  reason  that  neighbouring  countries,  and  countries  within  a  given  international 
organization, are more likely to have characteristics in common, determined by similar histories, 
similar cultures or even decisions and rules adopted in common in an international organization. 
                                                                                                                                                              
of  (unconditional)  convergence;  while  he  does  not  find  evidence  of  convergence  in  an  extended  sample  of  72 
countries. 
8 DeLong (1988) shows that the proper criterion for sample selection in analysing convergence is ex ante income 
level,  and  not  ex post. He  also  shows  that,  when  the  ex ante  criterion  is  used  and Baumol’s  OECD  sample  is 
modified slightly, the result of unconditional convergence no longer holds.  
9 Actually, the concept of convergence club is strictly related to the notion of conditional convergence. In the case of 
unconditional convergence, there is only one equilibrium level for all economies. For countries belonging to a club, 
instead, absolute and conditional convergence should be equivalent, because club affiliation (if correctly identified) 
should capture the economies’ “fundamentals” that are otherwise captured by the regressors included in conditional 
estimations.   14 
Indeed, some international organizations implicitly or explicitly pursue “convergence” as a goal. 
Further, geographic contiguity and membership in international organizations can also be viewed 
as  exogenous  determinants  of  those  conditioning  variables  used  by  some  studies  to  identify 
potential clubs. Finally, since the literature stresses that the only reliable method for measuring 
different degrees of convergence is to use control samples, and since my focus is the euro area, 
taken as an international organization, then the most suitable control samples appear to be other 
groups of countries that have decided to join an international organization.
10 
My first criterion − geographic contiguity − allows me to obtain 5 potential clubs as 
shown in Table 1. The first potential club is formed by all countries in my dataset, and thus I call 
it the “World”. The other four potential clubs are four continents: Europe, America, Africa and 
Asia. Oceania is excluded because it would include only Australia and New Zealand. 
Using the criterion of membership in international organizations, I obtain nine potential 
clubs (Table 2).
11 The first potential club is the euro area. My dataset covers 15 out of the 16 
euro area  countries,  excluding  only  Luxembourg.  The  “euro founders”  club  consists  of  the 
countries  that  adopted  the  single  currency  from  its  launch  in  January  1999.  There  were  11 
countries; my sample covers 10 of them (Luxembourg is excluded).
12 The distinction between the 
euro area as a whole and the euro founders serves to investigate whether convergence in the euro 
area has changed significantly with the entry of new countries.  
The third potential club is the European Union (the EU 27), composed of 27 members and 
represented in my sample by 26 countries (again, only Luxembourg is missing).
13 The OECD 
                                                 
10 Many works analyse convergence by selecting an affiliated group of economies, in particular belonging to the euro 
area  or  the  OECD.  For  example,  Bianco,  Gerali  and  Massaro  (1997)  present  a  comparison  of  six  developed 
economies and find that convergence across financial systems was limited. Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrrel (2001) 
find  that  France  in  particular  moved  towards  a  more  market oriented  system.  Byrne  and  Davis  (2002)  find  s 
convergence towards a more market oriented financial system for the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Examining 
euro area countries, Hartmann, Maddaloni and Manganelli (2003) find that the dispersion of currency, deposits and 
loans increased, while bond investment and financing became more uniform. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that in 
the last two decades the convergence of European financial markets has improved and become more market oriented. 
Analysing seven European countries, Murinde, Agung and Mullineux (2004) find convergence of equity issues and 
internal firm finance, but not of bank loans. Sørensen and Gutierrez (2006) conclude that the introduction of the euro 
has increased the degree of cross country homogeneity. By contrast, Dahl, Shrieves and Spivey (2006) reject the 
hypothesis that banks in different European countries have common activities. Affinito, De Bonis and Farabullini 
(2006) show the persistence of a country effect in the composition of national banks’ balance sheets. On the other 
hand, Goddard et al. (2007) conclude that the process of transition towards a single European banking market is 
multi faceted  and  ongoing.  Di  Giacinto  and  Esposito  (2008)  find  b convergence  for  indicators  of  financial 
development  of  13  European  countries,  but  not  for  banking  business.  Bruno  and  De  Bonis  (2009)  analyse  the 
financial accounts of eight OECD countries and find some signs of convergence. 
11 Table 2 also identifies the countries of each club that are excluded from my dataset because data are unavailable or 
series are too short. 
12 The single currency was adopted from the beginning by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece joined in 2001; Slovenia in 2007; Cyprus and Malta in 
2008; and Slovakia in 2009. 
13 The EU 27 indicates the 27 countries members of European Union. Previously, the acronyms were EU 12; EU 15 
and EU 25. In order not to overload my discussion, I do not analyse those “historical” clubs separately.   15 
club consists of 27 out of 29 countries (excluding Island and Luxembourg). All eight countries of 
the G8 are included in my dataset. The G20 club includes 16 out of 19 countries (Argentina, 
South Africa and Saudi Arabia are left out). The NAFTA club includes all three members. OPEC 
includes 9 out of 13 member countries, and the Arab League 14 out of 22.  
Finally,  I  obtained  three  “other”  clubs  which,  though  not  identified  by  geographic 
contiguity or affiliation in organizations, are often considered together in international analyses. 
BRIC  is  the  acronym  for  four  large,  rapidly  developing  countries:  Brazil,  Russia,  India  and 
China.  CEEC  is  the  club  of  13  Central  and  East  Europe  Countries.  “Former  socialists”  are 
countries were politically and economically similar at least until the end of 1980s.  
As is evident, my potential convergence clubs are partially overlapping, in the sense that 
some countries are included in several clubs. For example, France belongs to eight potential 
clubs: the euro area, the euro founders, the EU 27, the OECD, the G8, the G20, Europe, and the 
World; Indonesia belongs to four: the G20, OPEC, Asia, and the World. 
My clubs constitute good samples in terms of both the number of countries and their 
population. My complete sample includes the largest countries in the world, a total population of 
more than 5 billion and almost all of global GDP. Even when the sample number of countries is 
low compared with the actual number (that is the case of the Arab League), the missing countries 
are small. Nevertheless, my selection may suffer from two problems. First, some my potential 
clubs, obtained for geographic contiguity, may be under representative samples. For instance, the 
Europe club is a representative sample of the continent in terms of both population and number of 
countries; whereas the number of countries is low in the clubs America, Africa and Asia. Second, 
at least in two cases (NAFTA and BRIC), though the clubs are self representative, the number of 
countries is very small. Nonetheless, where possible I keep these clubs in the analysis for the sake 
of completeness and because their comparison is interesting in any case. At the same time, I am 
forced to drop the smallest clubs when the number of observations is very low.  
4. The data 
The methodology described in Section 2 is applied to my three variables of interest: one 
indicator  of  real  economic  development  (per  capita  income)  and  two  indicators  of  banking 
development (Deposits/GDP and Loans/GDP). The source of data is the International Monetary 
Fund database (IMF). 
Several studies, some of which are reviewed in this paper, have examined cross country 
banking convergence using variables that are very similar to my two indicators. Like others (e.g. 
Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000), I use private deposits and loans divided by GDP, excluding   16 
interbank business and credit granted to the public sector, as well as loans granted by central 
banks and development banks. Interbank transactions are excluded because I am interested in the 
relationship between banks and their final customers; credit to the public sector because banks 
that are allocating credit to the private sector are more likely to effectively monitor borrowers 
than banks that are allocating credit to government and public enterprises (Levine and Zervos, 
1998; Demirgüç Kunt and Levine, 2008).  
Ex ante, it is hard to guess which banking indicator is more likely to converge earlier 
(Affinito and De Bonis, 2011). Deposits might converge more because of reduced global use of 
currency in circulation for payments and because of increased cash remittances from richer to 
poorer countries; however, the indicator could be affected by differences in national saving rates 
and in the availability of alternative forms of saving. The Loans/GDP ratio might converge faster 
because it reflects the general and similar credit needs once they are weighted for GDP; however, 
convergence could be impeded by differences between countries in the size of firms, the size of 
stock exchanges, the securities issued by firms, and so on.  
I collected available annual data from 1964 to 2007 (44 periods for each country). The 
first  year  was  chosen  because  the  series  are  available  for  the  majority  of  countries  from  it 
onwards. In several cases the time series are shorter. For a few countries the length of time series 
differs for the different variables.
14 Table 3 provides summary statistics for the three variables in 
the 17 potential clubs. As expected, the G8 and the OECD present the highest average values for 
the per capita income, Africa the lowest. The highest figures for Deposits/GDP and Loans/GDP 
are in the euro area. Dispersion, measured by standard deviation, is lower in the euro area than in 
the  OECD,  but  that  of  banking  indicators  is  also  low  in  the  OPEC  and  Arab  League.  This 
confirms that the analysis needs more sophisticated statistical tools. 
In the exercise on conditional β convergence, even if I do not need to allow for specific 
factors influencing growth and convergence (as spelled out later), the matrix Xit of equation (1.1) 
contains a few control variables, typically used in the literature: GDP growth rate; a proxy for the 
size of the banking system; official exchange rates against the US dollar; inflation rates; and 
volumes of exports and imports. The source of data is again the IMF. 
A  further  methodological  choice  I  have  made  with  regard  to  the  data  deserves  to  be 
stressed. Even if I have long time series, in β  and σ convergence analysis, and thus in my first 
                                                 
14 The data are available for: Bulgaria from 1969; Indonesia from 1967 for GDP and 1980 for deposits and loans; 
Hungary from 1970 for GDP and 1982 for loans and deposits; the United Arab Emirates from 1973; Bahrain and 
Oman from 1975; China from 1978; Lebanon, Poland and Romania from 1980; Turkey from 1987; Yemen from 
1990;  Slovenia  from  1991;  Albania,  Russia  and  Ukraine  from  1992;  Croatia,  Macedonia,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia from 1993; Georgia from 1994; Spain (loans) from 1972; Ireland (deposits) 
from 1999.    17 
step (equations 1.1 and 1.2) and in the second part of my third step (equation 3.2), I split my 
entire sample period into different spans, averaging my observations over these intervals. This 
procedure allows me both to exploit the panel dimension of data and to emphasize their cross 
sectional  nature,  and  thus  allows  avoiding  the  trade off  between  panel  and  cross section 
estimation of the speed of convergence that was pointed out by the empirical growth literature. 
For example, Quah (1993 and 1996a,b) stresses that panel estimations, though they allow not 
taking steady states as identical, still tend to overestimate the speed of convergence. Barro (1997) 
and Durlauf and Quah (1999) contend that the cross sectional dimension of data contains long 
run  features  that  are  more  pertinent  to  growth  study  than  the  panel  estimation.  Hauck  and 
Wacziarg (2004), and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes (2005) point out that a cross sectional 
approach is preferable because development is imperfectly measured and persistent. Demirgüç 
Kunt and Levine (2008) argue that panel methods may be less precise in assessing long run 
growth issues than methods based on lower frequency data. 
In particular, the procedure of averaging data over several, non overlapping and non 
frequent years is widely accepted because it makes it possible (for a broad discussion see, for 
example, Quah, 1993 and 1996a,b; Islam, 1995 and 2003; Barro, 1997; Cellini, 1997; Lee et al., 
1998;  Temple,  1999):  (i)  to  enhance  the  long run  notion  of  convergence;  (ii)  to  reduce 
measurement  errors;  (iii)  to  abstract  from  business  cycle  fluctuations;  (iv)  to  decrease  serial 
correlation; and (v) to avoid short term disturbances and biases in favour of finding convergence 
that have been found when brief intervals and too frequent spans are used. On the other hand, 
using this procedure reduces the number of observations and forces me to give up the smallest 
clubs in the β analysis. 
The length of the intervals is chosen in such a way as to define periods of equal length and 
with an adequate number of years. In particular, my basic estimations (i.e. those presented in the 
tables) are carried out on three time intervals defined as r1, r2 and r3.
15 In any case, in order to test 
the robustness of my results and in particular their sensitivity to the definition of the spans, I try 
several combinations for the composition and length of the time intervals, both in the β  and σ 
convergence analysis. 
                                                 
15 For the same reasons, and to avoid an excessive sensitivity to the first period values, initial levels of variables are 
computed as averages over the previous period. In formal terms, in equation (1.1), the first periods t0 are respectively 
the time spans r2 and r1; the last periods T are respectively the time spans r3 and r2;  T
t t it Y T 0 )] [log( 1
= D  are the 
average growth rates of dependent variables for the periods r3 and r2; 
0 it Y  are the initial average values of the 
dependent  variables,  respectively,  in  the  periods  r2  and  r1; 
it X   are  the  average  values  of  other  regressors, 
respectively, in the periods r3 and r2 or in the spans r2 and r1 if they are lagged. In the σ convergence analysis I 
simply compute the averages of the three dependent variables for each country over each period, and then the cross 
section standard deviations. In the specifications presented in the tables: r1 is the span 1964 1978; r2 is 1979 1992; 
and r3 is 1993 2007.    18 
By contrast, my second step, based on stationarity tests, keeps all the available yearly (not 
averaged) observations. 
5. Results 
The results of my three steps may be interesting in themselves, be viewed as mutual 
robustness checks or read as successive moments of the analysis. 
5.1. First step (β  and σ  convergence): The euro area always exhibits signs of 
convergence 
To obtain the β coefficients, I implemented a pooled regression, respectively for per capita 
income, Deposits/GDP, and Loans/GDP.
16 The upper panel of Table 4 shows the results for the 
euro area club; the lower panels show the results for all countries in my sample (the “World”), 
for “Europe”, the EU 27 and the OECD. The results of the other potential clubs are not reported 
for β analysis because of the insufficient number of observations. 
Table 4 contains two specifications. The first specification does not contain regressors, 
initial  levels  apart,  and  corresponds  to  the  test  of  absolute  β convergence.  The  second 
specification reports the covariates included in the Xit matrix and represents a test of conditional 
β convergence. The natural logarithms of Loans/GDP and the GDP growth rate are computed as 
lagged averages when they are used as regressors, in line with the empirical literature on growth 
and finance. A part of this literature uses previous period lags as regressors in order to discern 
possible casual links (e.g. King and Levine, 1993a, b). However, even if this device is used to 
enhance the robustness of estimations, I am not interested in the effects of control variables 
because,  analysing  convergence,  I  focus  only  on  the  sign  and  statistical  significance  of  β. 
Moreover, I am confident that the most important condition is that the matrix Xit always includes 
country by country dummies. In line with Durlauf and Quah (1999) and Islam (2003), the idea is 
that these dummies capture all remaining national specificities, and so I do not need to add any 
other control variable, contrary to the literature that deals with the effect of specific factors on 
growth and convergence.
17 
                                                 
16 In the estimations, I used a standard robust regression model that implements a data dependent method for down 
weighting outliers.  
17 The prevailing literature states that the central factor underlying the divergence is the technology. In turn, the 
cross country differences in rates of technological progress can be explained by several factors. For example, a few 
studies include in the estimations variables measuring population health, political instability, educational attainment 
(e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993; Howitt, 2000), or geographical, institutional and policy variables (e.g. Parente and 
Prescott, 1994; Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002).   19 
Turning to my empirical results, for per capita income, absolute β convergence does not 
exist when I consider all the countries in my dataset, while it does emerge for the euro area, 
Europe, the EU 27, and the OECD. By contrast, a minor conditional convergence appears even 
for the World. This result is coherent with the prevailing empirical literature, which has found 
robust β convergence only for developed industrialized economies and reported mixed results 
when emerging countries are included in the regressions (see Baumol, 1986; Romer, 1989; King 
and Rebelo, 1989; Rebelo, 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Romer, 1994; Evans, 1996; 
Pritchett, 1997; Maddison, 2001).  
The results are interestingly diversified for the two banking indicators. The World does 
not converge at all. Deposits show neither absolute nor conditional convergence, and in no club. 
On the contrary, Loans seem to converge to similar levels in the euro area, Europe, the EU 27, 
and the OECD.
18  
The σ analysis allows me to compare different groups of countries at any point of time 
and the same club over time (Table 5). From the former point of view, the euro area and, even 
more, the euro founders, display the lowest intra group dispersion for my three indicators. From 
the latter perspective, the euro area, besides presenting the lowest dispersion, also shows a clear 
σ convergence for all three indicators.
19 The OECD, for example, which has the second lowest 
degree of dispersion, registers stable figures and then absence of σ convergence.  
As noted, β  and σ  analyses capture two partially different aspects that, taken together, 
give a more complete picture and reveal the uniqueness of the euro area, which is the only club 
that always exhibits signs of convergence (Table 6).  
5.2. Second step (tests of zero mean stationarity): The euro area stands out for 
banking convergence 
As illustrated in Section 2.2 and Figure 1, the tests of zero mean stationarity are run with 
two approaches based on equations (2.1) and (2.2). First, I analyse the individual differentials Dit
j 
between  each  pair  of  countries  belonging  to  a  certain  group,  including  the  World  club,  and 
therefore between all bilateral pairs: NT (NT – 1) / 2 = 2,080 observations. Second, I test the 
differentials 
A
it D   between  each  country  and  the  common  average  computed  for  countries 
belonging to the same club.  
                                                 
18 The results of Table 4 also validate my selection of clubs. In fact, if clubs are correctly identified, the value of β 
should not change when regressions are run with and without the set of conditioning variables. 
19  In  my  exercises,  there  are  cases  in  which  σ convergence  follows  absence  of  β convergence.  Yet  it  can  be 
demonstrated, on the contrary, that if there is no β convergence, there cannot be σ convergence (e.g. Barro and Sala 
i Martin, 1995). The reason for my seemingly strange result is twofold. First, it depends on my choice of averaging 
observations over three time intervals. Second, σ convergence is presented for all three time spans, while for β 
convergence one time observation is dropped when regressing the variable on its initial level.   20 
To make the results easier to read, I do not show all these tests. What I present, for both 
approaches and for each variable, are the percentage shares of convergent differentials on the 
total  number  of  differentials.  Figure  2  (geographical  clubs  and  “other”  clubs)  and  Figure  3 
(international organizations) present the results of the first approach (equation 2.1). Figures 4 
(geographical  clubs and  “other”  clubs)  and  Figure  5  (international  organizations)  present the 
results of the second approach (equation 2.2). 
For example, the G8 presents 28 combinations [NT (NT – 1) / 2 = 8×7/2 = 28] when I adopt 
equation (2.1), while it has 8 country observations when I follow equation (2.2). In the first 
approach, I found that 12 bilateral pairs of countries were convergent for per capita income, and 
so Figure 3 reports the percentage share of 42.9 (= 12/28×100). In the second approach, four G8 
countries converge to the common G8 per capita income mean, and so Figure 5 reports the 
percentage share of 50 (= 4/8×100). To facilitate comparison, the results for the euro area and 
euro founders are reported in all the figures. The right scale, labelled as banking convergence, is 
the sum of the two banking indicators. 
This second step basically confirms the results of the β  and σ  analyses. The degree of 
convergence is different for my three indicators and across the clubs; in particular, it is higher 
within each group than in the World as a whole.
20 The World club exhibits a generally low share 
of convergence (as it did not display signs of β  and σ  convergence). Symmetrically, the OECD 
confirms a good degree of convergence (as it showed β convergence).  
The  outcome  that  also  emerges  clearly  in  this  second  step  is  the  nature  of  effective 
convergence  clubs  of  the  two  euro  clubs.  In  the  first  approach  (Figures  2  and  3),  the  euro 
founders  show  a  higher  degree  of  convergence  than  all  the  other  clubs.  The  euro  area  is 
outstripped by several clubs as regards per capita GDP and Deposits, while its convergence is 
high for Loans/GDP. Even more, the second exercise (Figures 4 and 5) confirms that the euro 
founders are the most homogeneous club, while the euro area reveals its specificity in banking 
convergence: although other clubs exceed it for per capita income convergence, the euro area 
presents a common steady state for Deposits and notably for Loans.  
5.3.  Third  step  (parallel  convergences):  Banking  convergence  spurs  real 
convergence 
The results of the third step of my analysis are shown in Table 7. Briefly, the third step 
consists in regressing per capita income convergence on banking convergence, which in turn is 
instrumented in order to deal with endogeneity. The regressors bi in (3.1) and Bi in (3.2) (3.3) are 
                                                 
20 Needless to say, paraphrasing Islam (1995), there is probably little solace to be derived from finding that countries 
of a club are converging when the points to which they are converging remain very low.    21 
instrumented with two kinds of instrumental variables: four dummies capturing the legal origin of 
each country and four alternative indexes of banking supervisory practice.
21 
The  set  of  four  dummies  for  legal  origin  is  based  on  the  legal  scholars’  view  that 
national legal systems present sufficient similarities to be classified into four major families of 
law: English, French, German and Scandinavian.
22 La Porta et al. (1997) and (1998) asserted that 
legal traditions were typically introduced into countries through conquest and colonization and, 
as such, are largely exogenous. The same studies underscored that legal origin affects legal rules 
and institutions, and thus can be used as an instrument in a two stage procedure, where the 
second stage explains financial development. Since then, an abundant literature has taken legal 
origins as good instrumental variables because, in addition to be exogenous, they have a strong 
effect on finance and − of greater relevance for my purposes − also on banks.
23 
Despite the wide use of these instruments in the literature, I include a second kind of 
instrumental variable in my estimations and I carry out several checks (described below) to verify 
the robustness of my results, as the possible pitfalls of using legal origin as an instrument have 
been pointed out by La Porta et al. (2008) and Shleifer (2008), the authors who pioneered its use 
in  empirical  economics.
24  The  second  kind  of  instrumental  variable  includes  four  alternative 
indexes of banking supervisory practice. The four indexes are taken from Barth, Caprio and 
Levine  (2006),  and  are  calculated  using  a  cross country  database  on  Bank  Regulation  and 
Supervision originally kept by the World Bank. For each country they measure respectively: (i) 
                                                 
21 In addition, I use other instruments as robustness checks (see Section 5.4). 
22 In my exercises the omitted case is the Scandinavian dummy. 
23 See, among others, Rajan and Zingales (1998); Levine (1998 and 1999); Demirgüç Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); 
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000); Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000); Ongena and Smith (2000); Esty and Megginson 
(2003); Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes (2005); Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco (2005); Djankov et al. (2007); Qian 
and Strahan (2007); Demirgüc Kunt and Levine (2008); Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010). The evidence showing 
that  legal  origin  affects  banking  systems’  characteristics  deserves  to  be  stressed  because  I  use  legal  origins  as 
instruments for banking convergence. For example, it has been found that legal origins affect the number of banking 
relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000), the contours of foreign bank lending (Esty and Megginson, 2003), credit 
availability (Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005), private credit (Djankov et al., 2007), and bank lending rates (Qian 
and Strahan, 2007). Using banking indicators very similar to mine ones, Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010) find that 
they have a positive effect on lending volumes. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes (2005) also measure financial 
development through indicators very similar to those on which I estimated banking convergence.  
24 There are potentially two problems, one bearing on the channels through which legal origin influences finance, the 
other on the channels other than finance through which legal origin influences growth. With regard to the first issue, 
when La Porta et al. (2008) warn that “legal origins influence many spheres of law making and regulation, which 
makes it dangerous to use them as instruments”, they are referring to the fact that it is difficult to identify the 
channels through which legal origin influences finance, because legal origin influences finance through multiple 
channels (e.g. laws and regulations, their interpretation, contract enforcement, the judiciary’s quality and judicial 
flexibility). However, “this criticism in no way rejects the significance of legal origins in shaping outcomes [that is in 
affecting finance]; it speaks only to the difficulty of identifying the channel”. In this light, since I do not use legal 
origins as instruments for specific rules or institutions (because I use them as instruments for my general indicators 
of banking convergence), the question of the channels through which legal origin influences finance is irrelevant in 
my exercises. As for the second issue, La Porta et al. (2008), though they admit that legal origins may influence 
growth through their effect on finance, labour markets and competition, emphasize that “the most obvious potential 
channel of influence of legal origins on growth is financial development”. In any case, I have adopted a prudent 
approach in my estimations and have added other instruments and several checks.   22 
the restrictiveness of banking supervision, by defining the scope of credit institutions’ activities 
(e.g. if they are allowed to engage in securities business, to sell insurance, the rules for entry, 
etc.); (ii) the set of general supervisory powers; (iii) supervisory forbearance; and (iv) financial 
statement transparency. The idea is that these factors have a direct effect on banking systems’ 
characteristics but not on real convergence.  
However, these instrumental variables are likely to be correlated or even endogenous to 
the first one (the set of dummies of legal origin). In fact, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) show 
that cross country measures of banking regulation vary systematically by legal origin. This could 
bias my estimations when I use the two instruments simultaneously. To address this issue, in the 
third step I run three different specifications (Figure 1): the first specification (labelled a in Table 
7: 1a; 2a; and 3a) includes the two kinds of instrument, the second (labelled b) only the legal 
origins, and the third (labelled c) only an index of supervisory practice.
25 
The first part of Table 7 (specifications 1a; 1b; and 1c) reports the results of equation 
(3.1),  where  the  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  the  results  of  equation  (2.1), 
respectively, for per capita income and Deposits/GDP.  
The second part of Table 7 reports the results of an IV β analysis of per capita income 
using as a regressor the interaction term between the initial level of per capita income and two 
alternative  indicators  of  banking  convergence  measured  on  the  ratio  Loans/GDP.
26  The  first 
indicator of banking convergence (specifications 2a; 2b; and 2c) is a dummy that take the value 
of one when the country’s Loans/GDP ratio is zero mean stationary with the World average 
(equation  3.2,  which  uses  the  results  of  equation  2.2).  The  second  indicator  of  banking 
convergence (specifications 3a; 3b; and 3c) is the complement to one of the ratio between the 
standard deviation and its highest value (equations 3.2 3.3, which use the results of equation 1.2). 
I do not present estimations with other regressors, which, however, are run (Section 5.4), because 
the results of Table 7 are closer to the concept of absolute β convergence, and the presence of 
absolute convergence renders analysis of conditional convergence pointless. 
All IV estimations indicate that banking convergence has a significant impact fostering 
real  convergence.  The  standard  statistical  tests  (reported  in  the  Table  7)  signal  that  my 
instruments are likely to be weak in the model of equation (3.1).
27 However, the same statistical 
                                                 
25 In the results of Table 7, the supervisory practice index is the restrictiveness of banking supervision. However, I 
used alternatively all four indexes in my regressions and the results are equivalent. Instrumenting with the four 
indexes  of  banking  supervisory  practice,  there  are  fewer  observations  because  they  are  not  available  for  some 
countries in my dataset. 
26 I show the results obtained running equation (3.1) with the Deposits/GDP ratio and equations (3.2) (3.3) with the 
Loans/GDP ratio. However, the results are analogous using Loans in (3.1) and Deposits in (3.2) (3.3). 
27 In equation (3.1), both the dependent and covariate are not observed variables but proxies resulting from statistical 
tests, and thus both are subject to measurement errors. This may lead to inconsistency in the inferential procedure.   23 
tests corroborate the validity and strength of my instruments in the models of equations (3.2) 
(3.3).
28  Therefore,  while  Aghion,  Howitt  and  Mayer Foulkes  (2005)  found  that  financial 
development spurs real convergence, my results suggest that banking convergence also spurs real 
convergence.  
5.4. Robustness checks 
The  main  check  of  my  results  on  convergence  consisted  in  using  several  empirical 
methods. I adopted two different methodologies and two different measures/approaches for each 
methodology.  When  the  results  are  consistent  across  several  markedly  different  econometric 
methods,  they  appear  robust  and  reliable.  This  is  precisely  the  case  of  the  high  degree  of 
convergence  reached  by  the  euro area  countries  and  the  euro founders.  Moreover,  I  also 
performed the following checks.  
In the first step, in addition to estimation based on the three spans described in Section 4, I 
ran a single cross section regression, following the method of Barro and Sala i Martin; and I also 
tried to change the composition and the length of the three spans. These results were analogous to 
those of the pooled regression and so they are not reported. As for conditional β analysis, I ran 
several specifications by progressively introducing the explanatory variables in order to control 
for endogeneity; by substituting exports with exchange rates; by dropping each country in turn 
(since in the literature it is still an open question whether individual country outliers exist). The 
results remained stable.  
For the same reason, in the second step I also dropped each country in turn in the whole 
sample and in the single clubs. This exercise simultaneously changed both the numerator and the 
denominator of the shares shown in the Figures 2 5 and left the relative differences among clubs 
broadly stable.
29 Likewise, relative comparisons across clubs remained stable even applying to 
                                                                                                                                                              
However, I decided also to show the results of this model, which are weaker but equivalent to those found in 
equations (3.2) (3.3). 
28 In each of the three specifications (a), it was possible to carry out a Sargan test because the number of instruments 
is greater than the number of endogenous variables. The results of the tests indicate that the sample evidence is 
consistent  with  the  joint  validity  of  all  instruments.  In  particular,  they  corroborate  the  idea  that  legal  origin 
instruments affect growth only through financial indicators. In fact, if my instruments affected growth through a 
variable not included in my specifications, then the Sargan test should reject the null, that is to say the validity of 
instruments. In line with Aghion, Howitt and Mayer Foulkes (2005), I computed the Sargan test in specifications (b) 
as well, even if in this case the greaterr number of instruments derives from the use of three dummies, which refer to 
the different legal origins. The results again corroborate my choice of instruments. Moreover, in all specifications, in 
order to check the strength of my instruments, I estimated the reduced form of each specification, and I computed the 
corresponding F statistic. According to the reference value of the F statistic proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), 
and Stock and Watson (2003), which is equal to 10, the results of equation (3.1) are liable to be based on weak 
instruments. However, the results of equations (3.2) and (3.3), specifications 2 and 3, are based on valid and strong 
instruments. 
29 Since China is mentioned as a counterexample to the general findings on finance and growth (Allen, Qian and 
Qian, 2005), it is worth underscoring that my results remain stable even when China is dropped.    24
the differentials Dit in equations (2.1) and (2.2) either the ADF or the KPSS tests instead of both 
of them. The results remained the same even when I dropped observations over time and changed 
the first or the last sample period.  
The results of the third step were checked by: running other models without instrumenting 
(probit for the first exercise and OLS for the second exercise); dropping countries in turn; 
measuring alternatively banking convergence with Deposits or Loans; changing again the 
composition and length of the three time-spans; including my additional explanatory variables in 
matrix Xit and country dummies; and interacting the additional explanatory variables with the 
initial output.
30 The outcomes always remained stable. 
Finally, in addition to the instrumental variables and statistical tests already described in 
the previous subsection, I verified whether the results of my third step are determined by the 
choice of the instruments by using three further alternative instruments. The first was obtained 
interacting the legal origins with initial output instead of using the simple legal origins.
31 As a 
second alternative instrument, I used the lagged Bi of equation (3.3). As a third alternative 
instrument, I used the settler mortality (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001), interacted 
or not with initial output.
32 The results were always confirmed. 
6. Conclusions 
Combining the literature on euro-area banking convergence, real convergence and finance 
and growth, and comparing banking convergence with convergence of per capita income, I have 
pursued three goals in this paper. First, I sought to verify whether membership in international 
organizations and geographical contiguity constitute suitable criteria to select potential 
                                                 
30 As argued by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), the addition of other interactions serves both as a test for 
the robustness of the sign and significance of the relevant coefficient, and as a further test for instruments’ validity. 
In particular, it is interesting to mention the results when I include as a single or interacted regressor the natural 
logarithm of Loans/GDP (used in the matrix Xit. of my equation 1.1, and by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes as a 
proxy of financial development): (i) it is significantly positive if I include it as a non-interacted regressor and 
maintain my main interacted regressor (i.e. banking convergence × initial per-capita income); (ii) it is significantly 
negative if I interact it with the initial output and omit my main interacted regressor (and thus am able to replicate the 
result of Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes); (iii) it is statistically insignificant if I interact it with the initial output 
and maintain my main interacted regressor (which remains significantly negative). The results are substantially the 
same even alternating the use of my instruments. Therefore, in my sample, my result on the role of convergence is 
more robust than Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes’ result on financial development. 
31 Furthermore, following again Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), I used the interacted instrument (legal 
origin × initial per-capita income) to model the interaction term (banking convergence × initial per-capita income), 
and instrumented separately for the banking convergence component with the non-interacted legal origin.  
32 Several scholars considered settler mortality a strong instrument for financial development (e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2003). Of course, the variable is not available for non-ex-colonies. In order not to lose 
observations, I again replicated the methodology of Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), assigning settler 
mortality of New Zealand (the lowest available value in the dataset) to all non-ex-colonies. Alternatively, I set the 
settler-mortality of each country equal to the lowest value in the same continent (I again used the New Zealand value 
for European countries). In both cases I included in the regression a dummy equal to one for non-ex-colonies. the 
results always supported my outcomes.   25
convergence clubs around the world; in other words, whether such clubs converge more (and, if 
so, which ones). Second, I analysed if the convergence club formed by the euro-area countries 
represents a special case; in other words, if it converges even more than the other international 
clubs. Third, I tested whether banking convergence favours per capita income convergence.  
I reasoned that, since convergence is a relative concept, the comparison between the euro 
area and the other potential clubs can shed light on the effective degree of convergence reached 
by countries adopting the euro. Therefore, I split my entire sample of 65 countries in 17 partially 
overlapping potential convergence clubs, and I juxtaposed their convergence results. To this end, 
I analysed three indicators (per capita income, Deposits/GDP and Loans/GDP), and applied in the 
econometric exercises the concepts of β- and σ- convergence, on one hand, and stationarity tests, 
on the other. I obtained three main findings. 
First, convergence changes across the clubs and it is higher within the single groups than 
in the global sample. 
Second, despite some differences among the results of minor clubs, the euro area exhibits 
convergence according to all methodologies. In particular, euro-area convergence reaches its 
peak for banking indicators, confirming the expectation that the euro-area banking systems are 
more homogeneous. The euro-founders – the subset of countries in the euro from the beginning – 
show higher convergence than the euro area as a whole, signalling that there is room for 
improved convergence when the last joiners close the gap with the older members.  
Third, this paper provides evidence for the first time supporting the hypothesis that the 
exogenous component of banking convergence favours economic convergence.  
Taken together, these results imply that new euro-area entrants have to be chosen 
carefully because they can jeopardize the convergence that has been achieved by the first joiners. 
On the other hand, the successful entry of a country into the euro area enhances banking 
convergence and this in turn seems likely to improve per capita-income convergence.    26 
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Table 1– Countries in the dataset and their classification in potential geographical clubs 
Countries in dataset                             
("World" club)





























































United Arab Emirates U. A. Emirates
United Kingdom U. Kingdom
United States United States
Venezuela Venezuela
Yemen Yemen
Number of countries                           
in the dataset for each club
35 5 7 16
Total number of countries                
in each club
44 27 54 50    34 
Table 2 – Countries in the dataset and their classification in potential clubs for 
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Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria
Bahrain Bahrain
Brazil Brazil Brazil
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria




Czech Republic Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep.
Denmark Denmark Denmark
Egypt Egypt
Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia
Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland
France France France France France France France
Gabon Gabon
Georgia Georgia
Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
Greece Greece Greece Greece




Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland
Israel
Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Jordan Jordan
Kuwait Kuwait Kuwait
Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia
Lebanon Lebanon




Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico
Morocco Morocco
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands




Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland
Portugal  Portugal  Portugal  Portugal  Portugal 
Qatar Qatar Qatar
Romania Romania Romania Romania
Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia
Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia
Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia
South Korea South Korea South Korea





Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey
Ukraine Ukraine
United Arab Emirates U. A. Emirates U. A. Emirates
United Kingdom U. Kingdom U. Kingdom U. Kingdom U. Kingdom
United States United States United States United States United States
Venezuela Venezuela
Yemen Yemen
Number of countries in 
the dataset for each club
15 10 26 27 8 16 3 9 14 4 13 16
Total number of 
countries in each club
16 11 27 29 8 19 3 13 22 4 13 chenging
Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Island Argentina Ecuador Comoro
Luxembourg South Africa Iraq Djibouti







Countries in dataset 
("World" club)
Missing countries in the dataset
Euro International organizations' clubs
   35 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the 17 potential clubs in the dataset 
 
Kind of club Period
Per capita 
income





Observations 604                       569                       596                       Observations 324                       323                       323                      
Mean 12.13 0.65 0.67 Mean 15.55 0.82 0.77
Std. Dev. 10.98 0.23 0.32 Std. Dev. 12.05 0.52 0.39
Min 0.38 0.16 0.13 Min 0.31 0.13 0.08
Max 66.57 1.42 1.98 Max 48.12 3.05 2.00
Euro founders G20
Observations 440                       405                       432                       Observations 636                       615                       615                      
Mean 13.93 0.64 0.72 Mean 10.28 0.60 0.59
Std. Dev. 11.81 0.20 0.31 Std. Dev. 11.38 0.46 0.39
Min 0.38 0.20 0.13 Min 0.00 0.06 0.08
Max 66.57 1.22 1.98 Max 48.43 3.05 2.00
World NAFTA
Observations 2,355                    2,256                    2,287                    Observations 132                       132                       132                      
Mean 9.21 0.50 0.49 Mean 13.02 0.55 0.48
Std. Dev. 11.41 0.35 0.37 Std. Dev. 12.18 0.30 0.27
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 Min 0.43 0.08 0.11
Max 92.58 3.05 2.02 Max 48.12 1.60 1.39
Europe OPEC
Observations 1,129                    1,056                    1,083                    Observations 383                       367                       369                      
Mean 11.41 0.58 0.59 Mean 8.01 0.32 0.26
Std. Dev. 12.42 0.34 0.38 Std. Dev. 11.26 0.22 0.19
Min 0.15 0.00 0.00 Min 0.03 0.02 0.03
Max 92.58 3.05 2.02 Max 64.53 1.78 1.39
America Arab League
Observations 220                       220                       220                       Observations 539                       535                       537                      
Mean 10.03 0.44 0.40 Mean 6.65 0.39 0.34
Std. Dev. 10.86 0.28 0.27 Std. Dev. 10.04 0.24 0.28
Min 0.43 0.08 0.08 Min 0.12 0.02 0.01
Max 48.12 1.60 1.39 Max 64.53 1.78 1.90
Africa BRIC
Observations 308                       306                       308                       Observations 134                       126                       126                      
Mean 1.36 0.27 0.26 Mean 3.13 0.32 0.41
Std. Dev. 1.54 0.20 0.17 Std. Dev. 5.82 0.18 0.33
Min 0.06 0.02 0.03 Min 0.00 0.10 0.08
Max 8.11 0.85 0.69 Max 29.12 1.15 1.36
Asia CEEC
Observations 610                       586                       588                       Observations 275                       239                       239                      
Mean 8.27 0.50 0.46 Mean 3.79 0.34 0.33
Std. Dev. 10.81 0.40 0.40 Std. Dev. 3.18 0.16 0.20
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 Min 0.15 0.06 0.02
Max 64.53 2.33 2.00 Max 19.17 0.73 0.94
EU 27 Former socialists
Observations 929                       860                       887                       Observations 316                       278                       278                      
Mean 11.26 0.60 0.61 Mean 3.97 0.31 0.31
Std. Dev. 11.27 0.32 0.35 Std. Dev. 3.82 0.17 0.21
Min 0.38 0.11 0.02 Min 0.15 0.00 0.00
Max 66.57 3.05 2.02 Max 22.82 0.73 0.94
OECD
Observations 1,114                    1,067                    1,094                   
Mean 13.78 0.63 0.65
Std. Dev. 12.98 0.37 0.40
Min 0.11 0.06 0.02
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Table 4 
First step: β convergence analysis (equation 1.1) 
Per capita income Deposits/GDP Loans/GDP
Euro area
initial level of dependent variable  0.016 ***  0.024 **  0.016  0.058  0.024  0.092 **
0.004 0.012 0.013 0.045 0.016 0.040
Inflation rate (r 1) 0.000  0.001  0.005 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002
Exports/GDP (r 1) 0.133  0.273  0.592 ***
0.140 0.236 0.208
Ln(Loans/GDP) (r 1) 0.044 *
0.027
GDP growth rate (r 1)  0.481 *  0.725 **
0.289 0.346
Country by country dummies no yes no yes no yes
constant 0.089 *** 0.093 ** 0.009 0.132 0.013 0.261 ***
0.007 0.038 0.010 0.077 0.013 0.068
Number of observations 27 25 25 24 27 24
World
initial level of dependent variable  0.001  0.013 *  0.006  0.011  0.006 0.005
0.002 0.007 0.004 0.016 0.006 0.029
Inflation rate (r 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
Exports/GDP (r 1)  0.017 ** 0.044 0.024 *
0.008 0.084 0.013
Ln(Loans/GDP) (r 1) 0.032
0.021
GDP growth rate (r 1)  0.039  0.206
0.089 0.166
Country by country dummies no yes no yes no yes
constant 0.060 *** 0.125 *** 0.015 ***  0.022 0.019 ***  0.102
0.004 0.044 0.005 0.042 0.007 0.101
Number of observations 105 89 96 81 98 88
Europe
initial level of dependent variable  0.014 ***  0.022 *  0.012  0.059  0.022 **  0.107 ***
0.003 0.012 0.009 0.062 0.010 0.034
Inflation rate (r 1)  0.001  0.001  0.005 ***
0.002 0.003 0.002
Exports/GDP (r 1) 0.143  0.248  0.531 ***
0.144 0.372 0.189
Ln(Loans/GDP) (r 1) 0.040 *
0.025
GDP growth rate (r 1)  0.320  0.699 **
0.391 0.279
Country by country dummies no yes no yes no yes
constant 0.088 *** 0.147 0.009 0.118 0.014 0.343 **
0.004 0.206 0.007 0.136 0.009 0.151
Number of observations 47 40 40 37 42 39
EU 27
initial level of dependent variable  0.015 ***  0.023 **  0.013  0.053  0.024 *  0.118 ***
0.004 0.011 0.011 0.039 0.012 0.025
Inflation rate (r 1) 0.000  0.001  0.005 ***
0.002 0.002 0.001
Exports/GDP (r 1) 0.147  0.254  0.613 ***
0.124 0.238 0.138
Ln(Loans/GDP) (r 1) 0.040 *
0.021
GDP growth rate (r 1)  0.377  0.949 ***
0.273 0.225
Country by country dummies no yes no yes no yes
constant 0.089 *** 0.192 * 0.008 0.364 0.013 0.300 ***
0.006 0.109 0.008 0.241 0.011 0.095
Number of observations 39 35 35 33 37 34
OECD
initial level of dependent variable  0.013 ***  0.042 ***  0.007  0.050  0.023 ***  0.082 *
0.003 0.012 0.007 0.034 0.008 0.044
Inflation rate (r 1)  0.003 * 0.000  0.006 *
0.002 0.001 0.003
Exports/GDP (r 1) 0.297 *  0.004 0.418
0.172 0.256 0.307
Ln(Loans/GDP) (r 1) 0.047 **
0.021
GDP growth rate (r 1)  0.245 0.051
0.223 0.369
Country by country dummies no yes no yes no yes
constant 0.084 *** 0.314 ** 0.012 * 0.020 0.012  0.189
0.005 0.115 0.006 0.081 0.008 0.118














Table  reports  regression  coefficients  and  associated  standard  errors  in  italics.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively.   37 
Table 5 
First step: 
σ convergence analysis (equation 1.2) 
 
Kind of club Period
Per capita 
income





r 1 = 1964 1978 0.53 0.40 0.44 r 1 = 1964 1978 0.33 0.32 0.46
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.52 0.30 0.34 r 2 = 1979 1992 1.27 0.35 0.33
r 3 = 1993 2007 0.50 0.29 0.37 r 3 = 1993 2007 0.83 0.72 0.66
Euro founders G20
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.46 0.30 0.43 r 1 = 1964 1978 2.39 0.57 0.57
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.44 0.23 0.30 r 2 = 1979 1992 2.13 0.59 0.61
r 3 = 1993 2007 0.26 0.21 0.21 r 3 = 1993 2007 1.46 0.61 0.69
World NAFTA
r 1 = 1964 1978 1.64 0.68 0.62 r 1 = 1964 1978 0.89 0.39 0.27
r 2 = 1979 1992 1.59 0.54 0.70 r 2 = 1979 1992 0.96 0.55 0.64
r 3 = 1993 2007 1.37 0.73 0.88 r 3 = 1993 2007 0.83 0.59 0.67
Europe OPEC
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.59 0.40 0.46 r 1 = 1964 1978 1.71 0.55 0.28
r 2 = 1979 1992 1.38 0.41 0.59 r 2 = 1979 1992 1.45 0.56 0.40
r 3 = 1993 2007 1.20 0.76 0.82 r 3 = 1993 2007 1.56 0.74 0.80
America Arab League
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.75 0.50 0.37 r 1 = 1964 1978 1.54 0.50 0.45
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.85 0.47 0.53 r 2 = 1979 1992 1.22 0.43 0.75
r 3 = 1993 2007 0.84 0.62 0.75 r 3 = 1993 2007 1.31 0.55 0.87
Africa BRIC
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.70 0.60 0.41 r 1 = 1964 1978 3.24 0.05 0.24
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.90 0.55 0.44 r 2 = 1979 1992 2.14 0.13 0.46
r 3 = 1993 2007 1.00 0.85 0.89 r 3 = 1993 2007 1.30 0.40 0.68
Asia CEEC
r 1 = 1964 1978 2.50 0.58 0.64 r 1 = 1964 1978 0.22 n.a. n.a.
r 2 = 1979 1992 2.01 0.55 0.87 r 2 = 1979 1992 0.99 0.37 0.84
r 3 = 1993 2007 1.44 0.50 0.85 r 3 = 1993 2007 0.52 0.50 0.49
EU 27 Former socialists
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.57 0.39 0.42 r 1 = 1964 1978 0.22 n.a. n.a.
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.77 0.38 0.54 r 2 = 1979 1992 1.27 0.34 0.81
r 3 = 1993 2007 0.92 0.55 0.61 r 3 = 1993 2007 0.76 0.63 0.58
OECD
r 1 = 1964 1978 0.70 0.45 0.54
r 2 = 1979 1992 0.79 0.47 0.63











   38 
 
Table 6 
First step: summary of results (equations 1.1 and 1.2) 
 
Per capita GDP  Deposits/GDP  Loans/GDP 


















Euro area  yes  Yes  yes  No  no  yes  no  yes  yes  Euro 
Euro founders  yes  Yes  yes  No  yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
World  no  Yes  yes  No  no  no  no  no  no 
Europe  yes  Yes  no  No  no  no  yes  yes  no 
Geographical 
contiguity 
Asia  yes  Yes  yes  No  no  yes  no  no  no 
EU 27  yes  Yes  no  No  no  no  yes  yes  no 
OECD  yes  Yes  no  No  no  no  yes  yes  no 
G20  yes  Yes  yes  No  no  no  no  no  no 
OPEC  no  No  yes  No  yes  no  no  no  no 
International 
organizations 
Arab League  no  No  yes  No  no  no  no  no  no 
In order to improve the comparisons, Table 6 also summarizes the results of β analysis for some clubs (the euro founders, Asia, the G20, OPEC and the Arab League) not detailed in Table 4 because 
of sample size problems. In any case, their results are mostly confirmed by the second step of my analysis. 
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Figure 2 
Second step   first approach (equation 2.1) 
Tests of differences of each country with every other country in the club 
(percentage shares of statistically similar bilateral differences in each club) 
































Second step   first approach (equation 2.1) 
Tests of differences of each country with every other country in the club 
(percentage shares of statistically similar bilateral differences in each club) 










Euro area Euro 
founders













Per capita GDP Deposits/GDP Loans/GDP Banking convergence (right scale)    40 
Figure 4 
Second step   second approach (equation 2.2) 
Tests of differences of each country with the mean of the club  
(percentage shares of statistically similar differences in each club) 
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Table 7 
Third step – parallel convergences: banking convergence spurs real convergence 
5.164 *** 2.233 ** 7.825 **
1.716 1.118 3.205
Interaction:
initial level of per-capita 
income × stationary 
Loans/GDP -0.023 *** -0.021 *** -0.027 ***
(differentials from the mean 




initial level of per-capita 
income × covergent 
Loans/GDP  -0.176 *** -0.169 *** -0.179 ***
(far from standard deviation 
of the World club, based on 
equation 1.2 and 3.3)
0.037 0.039 0.038
-1.397 ** -0.414 -2.256 ** 0.077 *** 0.072 *** 0.079 *** 0.072 *** 0.067 *** 0.072 ***
0.557 0.340 1.038 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005
Sargan test: Chi-sq-statistic
F-statistic of reduced form
Number of observations     
Equations 3.2-3.3
Constant 
 Stationary Deposits/GDP       
(bilateral differentials 
approach)
Average growth rate of per-
capita income
















Stationary per-capita income 
(results of equation 2.3)








Table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. In model (1), the dependent variable and 
the regressor are dummies assuming value one when the bilateral differentials of, respectively, per-capita income and 
the Deposits/GDP ratio, between a pair of countries are zero-mean stationary (results of equation 2.1). Models (2) and 
(3) are IV absolute β-convergence estimations. The dependent variable is the average growth rate of per-capita GDP, 
and the key regressor is the interaction-term between the initial level of per-capita income and a proxy of banking 
convergence (measured on the ratio Loans/GDP). The components of the interaction-term are included, but not 
reported.  In model (2), the proxy of banking convergence is a dummy assuming value one when the country 
converges to the average of my entire sample (equation 2.2). In model (3), the proxy of banking convergence is the 
complement to one of the World standard deviation. In order to take account of possible endogeneity problems, in all 
cases regressions are ran by IV estimations, instrumenting for banking convergence, with: in specifications (a), both an 
index of supervisory practice and the legal origin of each country; in specifications (b), only the legal origins; and in 
specifications (c), only the index of supervisory practice. The index of supervisory practice is not available for some 
countries in my dataset. Table reports also the χ²-statistic of the Sargan test for specifications (a) and (b), where it is 
applicable; and the F-statistics of the reduced forms of each specification. ***, ** denote statistical significance at 1% 
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